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Should public assets such as infrastructure, education, and the environment earn the same 
return as private investments? We consider if time-inconsistent decision-makers can gain 
from institutions that enforce cost-benefit rules on large projects that influence the economy 
as a whole. Long-term public investments provide commitment to current preferences, 
leading to investment biases in such assets. The institutionalized cost-benefit prudence 
eliminates such biases but we show that this behavioral rule has no general social value: it 
implements Pareto efficiency if and only if preferences are time-consistent, and decreases 
welfare otherwise. We find that the long-term cost-benefit prudence is fundamentally about 
income transfers to the future, implying that efficient behavioral rules should target savings 
directly rather than the division of current investment resources. 
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Cost-beneﬁt analysis (CBA) as a way to bring government projects and programs un-
der public scrutiny is a feature of good governance which most economists agree on.
CBA is routinely applied to individual small projects but increasingly also to large pro-
grams that inﬂuence the economy as a whole as, for example, the Stern Review on
climate change (2006) has illustrated.1 Recently, the ﬁnancial crisis has increased the
demand for economy-wide analysis of costs and beneﬁts of public spending and regula-
tions (e.g., Rogoﬀ 2010, and Hanson et al. 2011). Such economy-level CBA exercises
require an integrated assessment of how to best allocate overall resources between public
and private uses, introducing a complication not present in the small-project cases: large
programs inﬂuence the direction of the economy over time and thus choices feasible in
the future. Today’s investments in energy-supply infrastructure shape the conceivable
future technology choices, similarly as public transport and city planning mold the fu-
ture transportation solutions. Public education not only inﬂuences the productivity of
the population but also alters the overall set of activities that can be considered in the
future. Future biodiversity depends on current decisions to establish and maintain large
natural parks but this may prevent us from creating wealth in some other form. These
public choices allow partial commitment to today’s preferred course of actions, while
the value generated by the choices depends also on the preferences in the future which
may not be congruent with those today. In this paper, we consider if time-inconsistent
decision-makers can gain from institutions that enforce “cost-beneﬁt prudence” on large
projects that inﬂuence the economy as a whole.
Inconsistencies that we have in mind can arise from time-variant preferences (Strotz,
1956), intergenerational altruism (Phelps and Pollak, 1968), or self-control problems
(Laibson, 1997). In climate change, it seems compelling to argue that we may not want
to distinguish between the welfare of generations 100 and 101, although we discount
that of the near-future generations; the future beneﬁts are then converted to present
values at discount rates declining with the time horizon, which introduces inconsistencies
into climate policies (Karp 2005).2 Our point of departure is the observation that time-
1While the Review is the most comprehensive economic report on the climate problem, there is a
large literature considering the cost-eﬀectiveness of climate policies; see Nordhaus (1993) for an early
contribution.
2Non-constant discount rates can also result from aggregation over heterogenous individuals (Gol-
lier and Zeckhauser, 2005, Lengwiler, 2005), or from uncertainty (Weitzman, 2000, Gollier, 2002) in
conjunction with consistent preferences. We come back to this question in the concluding section.
2inconsistent decision-makers value assets not only for the net beneﬁts they generate, but
also for the commitment they provide (Laibson, 1997). Intuitively, a decision-maker who
values commitment provided by the long-term asset ends up “over-investing” in it, when
allowed to freely choose the division of savings between long-term and short-term uses.
One way to view the institutionalized cost-beneﬁt prudence is to think of a budget
oﬃce scrutinizing the public uses of resources, and enforcing the requirement that public
investments should earn at least the same comparable return as private investments.3
The budget oﬃce thus allows decision makers to freely choose allocations over time but,
through the return-requirement rule, sets up an institutional constraint on how resources
can be divided between public and private uses. While such rules are easy to advocate
and therefore may arise as a “social contract”characterizing good public governance, it
is not clear that the simple cost-beneﬁt rules have social value in the setting we have
described.
Casting the analysis in a Ramsey saving-problem where savings are allocated between
the traditional neoclassical capital and long-term public assets,4 and where preferences
are as in the Phelps-Pollak-Laibson framework, we ﬁnd that institutionalized cost-beneﬁt
rules have no general social value: they implement Pareto eﬃciency if and only if pref-
erences are time-consistent, and decrease welfare otherwise. Indeed, multi-generation
(multi-self) Pareto eﬃciency —a natural concept for eﬃciency in this context— cannot
follow from one rule for the division of assets between diﬀerent maturities in a closed
economy.5 Intuitively, imposing the cost-beneﬁt rule as an institutional constraint re-
moves the investment biases of inconsistent decision-makers, but the rule also removes
the commitment value built into the public assets, thereby reducing the overall value of
savings as a channel for transferring wealth to the future; the rule limits, e.g., the agents’
3see, e.g., Nordhaus 2007 for a discussion of this return requirement for public investments.
4The former capital can be interpreted as resulting from the aggregation of individual decisions and
is thus private by nature, while the latter type of capital is public by assumption. We abstract from
the aggregation and political economy aspects of the public decisions in order to pinpoint the allocative
distortions not solved by CBA even in the representative agent framework. In this closed economy,
the capital stock produces endogenously the rate-of-return requirement, or the opportunity cost, of the
public investments; such an approach is needed, for example, in the climate context where the policy
has an eﬀect on the growth path of the economy (see, e.g., Weitzman 2007 and Nordhaus 2007).
5Since we focus on multi-generation welfare comparisons where inconsistencies can arise, e.g., from
altruism rather than individuals’ behavioral anomalies, we work with the multi-generation Pareto cri-
terion. See Bernheim and Rangel (2009) for an alternative concept and its relationship to the Pareto
criterion. We brieﬂy discuss Bernheim and Ragel’s deﬁnition of a weak welfare optimum in connection
to our deﬁnition of Pareto eﬃciency.
3altruistic plans for the future.
The analysis leads us to conclude that the long-term cost-beneﬁt problem is funda-
mentally an intertemporal income-transfer problem where eﬃcient rules should target
savings directly. While rules for savings are much harder to put on as a simple principle
or to delegate to the budget oﬃce for implementation, we show that welfare-improving
and self-enforcing savings rules have a simple structure. In contrast to stand-alone cost-
beneﬁt rules, savings rules target the source of the problem directly, and thereby reduce
the agents’ need to use long-term assets for commitment purposes, which explains why
such rules also reduce the investment biases of inconsistent decision-makers. In other
words, as agents can interact only in the order of their appearance in the time line, they
cannot transfer wealth directly to the intended beneﬁciary represented in the welfare
function and the allocation without any policy measures will be ineﬃcient. Enforcing
productive eﬃciency through the cost-beneﬁt rule worsens the problem of the incomplete
income transfers, whereas savings rules target the market imperfection directly.
The welfare we consider depends on both current utilities and those of the future
generations.6 To deﬁne sharply the connection between the cost-beneﬁt rule, inconsistent
preferences and welfare, we consider whether the equilibrium is observationally consistent
with a ﬁctitious (consistent-preferences) “Planner”, i.e., an agent who may not represent
the actual agent population but who would consider the equilibrium allocation optimal.
It is well-known that the hyperbolic discounting models popularized by Laibson (1997),
and also O’Donough and Rabin (1999), and Barro (1999) can be interpreted this way: the
equilibrium paths of these models maximize a utility stream for some sequence of utility
weights but these weights need not represent the underlying (multi-self) preferences.
We ﬁnd that enforcing the institutionalized cost-beneﬁt rule establishes observational
equivalence with a Planner, but the Planner does not represent the population, and
Pareto eﬃciency (or improvement) does not follow from the rule. The question of whether
the Planner represents the population provides a direct check for eﬃciency in this po-
tentially complicated behavioral environment. It also allows us to analyze rules on total
savings that would make the Planner representative for the agent population.
We ﬁrst present a simple three-period example to illustrate the main results. We then
extend the framework to an inﬁnite number of periods,7 which is needed for the analysis
6In principle, welfare for a given generation can look backwards and forwards in time, i.e., depend
also on the utility levels in the past (in a diﬀerent setting, Caplin and Leahy (2004) consider such a
criterion).
7However, the equilibrium analysis requires restrictions not present in three periods (see also Krusell
4of self-enforcing savings rules and for a more ﬂexible analysis of our results in relation to
the persistence of the public asset. For illustrational purposes we connect our analysis
to the literature on discounting and optimal climate change policy.
2 A three-period model
2.1 The setting
We ﬁrst consider three generations, living in periods t = 1,2,3. In each period, con-
sumers are represented by an aggregate agent having a utility function and production
technology. Consumption programs (c,q) = (c1,c2,c3,q) ∈ A = A1 ×A2 ×A3 ×Aq (non-
empty intervals) constitute a consumption level for each generation and the ﬁnal asset
q to the last generation. Generations are assumed to have the following simple welfare
representation
w1 = u1(c1) + ρ[u2(c2) + θ[u3(c3) + v(q)]] (1)
w2 = u2(c2) + σ[u3(c3) + v(q)] (2)
w3 = u3(c3) + v(q), (3)
where all utility functions ut and v are assumed to be continuous and, in addition,
strictly concave, diﬀerentiable, and satisfying limc→0 u′
t = ∞ and limq→0 v′ = ∞. For
interpretation, we assume that parameters ρ,θ,σ ∈ [0,1] are discount factors, although
this is not necessary in this three period model. Inconsistent preferences are identiﬁed by
θ  = σ, i.e., the ﬁrst and second generations disagree on the relative weight given to the
last generation’s utility. When θ > σ = ρ, the near future is discounted more than the
far future. Following Phelps and Pollak (1968) or, e.g., Saez-Marti and Weibull (2005)
this can be interpreted as pure altruism towards the last generation, or alternatively as
lack of (governmental) self control (Laibson, 1997).8 For completeness, we also allow for
the case θ < σ. This could represent a situation where the representative agent looks
one period ahead with less interest in the future further away.
et al. 2002, and Karp 2005, and 2007).
8We can obtain the common β,δ model as in Phelps-Pollak-Laibson if ρ = σ, by deﬁning β = ρ/θ
and δ = θ. Then, w1 = u1 + βδu2 + βδ
2u3 and w2 = u2 + βδu3. Inconsistencies are indentiﬁed by
β < 1, corresponding to θ > σ in our case. For our purposes, it is slightly more straightforward to name
the long-run weights as θ and σ. The weight ρ allows some freedom in terms of interpretations (e.g.
the length of a period may be diﬀerent for t = 1,2,3) but is inconsequential for the consistency of the
preferences.
5Generations consider choices in a convex consumption possibility set A ⊆ R4
+. The
consumption possibilities are determined by a strictly concave neoclassical production
function ft(kt), where kt is the capital stock they receive from the previous generation.
The ﬁrst generation starts with a capital stock k1, and produces output which can be
used to consume c1, to invest in capital for the immediate next period k2, or to invest in
a durable asset for the third period, q:
c1 + k2 + q = f1(k1). (4)
The second agent starts with the capital stock k2, which produces output f2(k2), and can
use its income to consume c2, or to invest in capital for the third period k3:
c2 + k3 = f2(k2). (5)
In this simple example, we abstract from possibilities of the second consumer to invest
in the durable asset q. In the next section, we consider a more ﬂexible form to describe
dynamics for the public good. The third consumer derives utility from its consumption,
c3 = f3(k3), (6)
and from the inherited durable asset v(q).
2.2 Welfare and eﬃciency




in (1)-(3). If we maximize w1, subject to the constraints w2 ≥ w∗
2, and w3 ≥ w∗
3 and
feasibility constraints (4)-(6), then we must ﬁnd the same allocation, and non-negative
Lagrange multipliers (α,β) ∈ R2
+ for the welfare constraints. That is, the Pareto eﬃcient
allocation is also the solution of a welfare program maximizing
W(c,q) = w1 + αw2 + βw3 (7)
= u1(c1) + (ρ + α)u2(c2) + (ρθ + ασ + β)[u3(c3) + v(q)] (8)
subject to (4)-(6).9 The conclusion also holds the other way around: any solution to
a welfare maximization program with some (α,β) ∈ R2
+ is Pareto eﬃcient. Strict con-
cavity of the production and utility functions ensures the uniqueness of the allocation.
9We notice that a Pareto optimum as deﬁned by Bernheim and Rangel (2009, Corollary 2) need
not maximize the above welfare program. Bernheim and Rangel’s condition deﬁnes a Pareto optimum
through a lower bound for w1. An important distinction with multi-self eﬃciency is that the Bernheim-
Rangel ordering cannot distinguish between two utility sequences that are close, even when one is strictly
6Therefore, we can associate any Pareto eﬃcient allocation with a pair of positive welfare
weights (α,β) ∈ R2
+, and also with a “Planner” whose objective function is the corre-
sponding W(c,q) giving some positive weight for all generations.10 If and only if weights
are positive, we say that the Planner is representative, and the allocation is Pareto eﬃ-
cient.11 Instead of the above welfare aggregator, we can characterize the Planner deﬁned
through a utility aggregator. For this, consider some feasible equilibrium allocation (c,q)
implying a stream of utilities (u∗
1,u∗
2,u∗
3,v∗), such that the allocation maximizes
U(c,q) = u1(c1) + α
′u2(c2) + β
′[u3(c3) + v(q)]. (9)
for some positive utility weights (α′,β
′) ∈ R2
+. If such positive weights exist, the allocation
is observationally equivalent to a Planner’s optimum with objective U(c,q), or shortly,
the equilibrium is Planner-equivalent — if and only if the utility weights are positive,
we say that the allocation is Planner-equivalent. However, the Planner deﬁned this
way need not be representative; as in “hyperbolic” discounting cases, the observational
Planner implied by the equilibrium may represent none of the agents (Barro, 1999), or
more normatively, the utility weights could represent long-run preferences (O’Donough
and Rabin, 1999), or the ﬁrst agent’s preferences. In our multi-generation context, we
ﬁnd it natural to look for a Planner that is representative, but it will be of interest to
discuss also the weaker concept of Planner-equivalence because only the latter concept
will be implied by the cost-beneﬁt requirement.12 Whereas Pareto eﬃciency immediately
above the other.
Consider two sequences A and B, both with constant utility, sequence A slightly above sequence B.
Our multiple-self eﬃciency unambiguously ranks A above B. Bernheim and Rangel (2009) show that A
and B cannot be ordered based on choices. They construct an auxiliary sequence C (e.g. high utility
for the second agent, low utility for the ﬁrst and third agent) such that the ﬁrst agent prefers A over B
over C, while the second agent prefers C over A over B. If the ﬁrst agent has to choose between {A,C}
and {B}, foresight of the second agent’s choice implies he will choose {B}. Therefore, from a choice
perspective, B is not inferior to A.
10Note that here the welfare is determined in a forward-looking manner but we could also deﬁne
backward-looking welfare weights as in Caplin and Leahy (2004).
11We rule out allocations where the weight on w1 equals zero. The weight on w1 approaches zero, in
relative terms, when at least one of the other weights becomes suﬃciently large.
12One may also interpret positive welfare weights as “pure altruism” of the Planner. However, altruism
of the Planner is not equivalent to that of the agents, so that while individual agents may give pure
positive altruistic weights on future welfare levels, the equilibrium outcome need not imply positive
welfare weights. Saez-Marti and Weibull (2005) describe the agents’ discount functions consistent with
pure altruism; in our case, the condition is θ > σ. As we will see, in equilibrium this implies purely
altruistic agents but negative welfare weighting, thus the Planner is not “altruistic”.
7implies Planner-equivalence, the converse is not immediate:
Remark 1 A Planner-equivalent allocation, utility weights α′ and β
′, is representative
(Pareto-eﬃcient) if and only if
α
′ ≥ ρ (10)
β
′ ≥ ρθ + (α
′ − ρ)σ. (11)
It is clear that if the stated inequalities hold, there are positive welfare weights (α,β)
corresponding to the utility weights (α′,β
′), and respecting the original preference struc-
ture (1)-(3). The “only if” part follows from the observation that if one of the inequalities
is not met, then one of the implied welfare weights α or β must be negative. Intuitively,
the Planner represents all generations only if it gives weights on future utilities that
are suﬃciently large so that future generations receive non-negative welfare weights in
addition to those coming directly from previous generations, e.g., due to altruism.
This notion of a Planner will be useful because it provides direct access to the welfare
properties of the equilibria considered below. First, in the equilibrium without the cost-
beneﬁt requirement, we can show that there is no Planner at all, i.e., no implied utility
weights (α′,β
′) exist, and consequently Pareto eﬃciency can immediately be ruled out.
Second, the cost-beneﬁt rule implies Planner-equivalence, and vice versa, but the Planner
is not representative, i.e., the implied welfare weights are not positive. Finally, in the
end of the paper, (for the inﬁnite horizon model) we discuss savings rules that imply a
representative Planner, i.e., these savings rules imply Pareto eﬃciency.
2.3 Eﬃciency and the cost-beneﬁt rule
We describe now how the cost-beneﬁt rule follows from Pareto eﬃciency. For any such
allocation, we have α′ = ρ+α > 0 and β
′ = ρθ+ασ+β > 0; for convenience of notation,
we use the utility maximization program (9) in this section. The ﬁrst-order conditions



















Denote by MRSi,j > 0 the marginal-rate of substitution of consumptions between pe-
riods (i,j) (deﬁned to be positive). Let Ri,j denote the (compound) rate of return on
capital from period i to j. We can then re-express the ﬁrst-order conditions as the usual








Thus, the marginal rate of substitution equals the return on savings. For the investment
in the public asset q to the last generation, the ﬁrst-order condition requires u′
1 = β
′v′,
which we rewrite as
1 = MRS1,q (14)
where MRS1,q is deﬁned between period 1 consumption and q. To account for the
opportunity cost of transferring period 1 output to the asset q, combine MRSq,3 =





This is the consumption-based cost-beneﬁt rule. The beneﬁt of one unit of investment in
the long-term asset q is measured in terms of the third-period consumption good. This
return to direct long-term investments should equal the opportunity cost determined
by the compound return on capital k. Under eﬃciency, the long-term asset q should
yield the same return as the capital asset k. Noticeably, the cost-beneﬁt rule is neutral
with respect to, that is, independent of, weights given to each generation’s utility. The
cost-beneﬁt rule is a necessary and suﬃcient test for the existence of a Planner.
Lemma 1 An allocation with strictly positive consumption, capital and public investment
is Planner-equivalent, that is maximizes U(c,q) with positive α′ and β
′, if and only if the
cost-beneﬁt rule is satisﬁed.
Proof. Necessity of the cost-beneﬁt rule has been established above. For suﬃciency,
we notice that given the allocation, we can construct positive weights α′ and β
′ from (12)
such that with these weights the Planner prefers not to deviate from {k2,k3,c1,c2,c3}.
The cost-beneﬁt rule then ensures that the ﬁrst-order condition for q is also satisﬁed.
The equivalence will be instrumental in our equilibrium analysis. First, if the cost-
beneﬁt rule is not satisﬁed, the equilibrium allocation implies that no Planner can exist.
We ﬁnd in the next section that in equilibrium the cost-beneﬁt rule will not hold, so
the conclusion for eﬃciency is immediate. Then, in the following section, we impose the
cost-beneﬁt rule as an institutional constraint on the equilibrium. We show that such
an equilibrium implies positive utility weights and thus restores the Planner-equivalence,
but the implied welfare weights are not all positive unless preferences are consistent.
92.4 Equilibrium
Consider now the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game where generations
choose consumptions and investments in the order of their appearance in the time line,
given the preference structure (1)-(3).
The third agent consumes all capital received and enjoys the long-term asset. The
second agent decides on the capital k3 transferred to the third agent, given the long-
term asset q chosen by the ﬁrst agent and the capital inherited k2. We thus have a
policy function k3 = g(k2,q), but for the separable utility speciﬁcation, second-period
investment only depends on the stock of capital received, k3 = g(k2). The policy function









The strict concavity of utility implies consumption smoothing, and thus if the second
agent inherits marginally more capital k2, the resulting increase in output is not saved
fully but rather split between the second and third generation:
Lemma 2 Policy function g satisﬁes 0 < g′ < R1,2.









































2 = R1,2 (17)
as u′′
t,f′′
t < 0 and f′
t,u′
t > 0.
The ﬁrst agent decides on consumption and investment in the long-term asset, given
the policy function g, to maximize its welfare
w1 = u1 + ρ[u2(f2(k2) − g(k2)) + θu3(f3(g(k2)) + θv3(q)].


















10The equations reﬂect the fact that the marginal cost of investment, i.e., the marginal












This condition is the equilibrium version of the cost-beneﬁt rule (15). To assess the
deviation from the rule (15), consider the diﬀerence between the equilibrium market
























This together with Lemma 2 implies




Thus, in equilibrium, the ﬁrst agent invests in the long-term asset q up to a point
where the rate of return falls short of the rate of return on capital over the same period,
if and only if σ < θ, i.e., the ﬁrst agent gives a higher weight to the long-term utility
than the second agent. The result has a very simple intuition. The ﬁrst consumer would
like to transfer more wealth to the third consumer, compared with the preferred wealth
transfer of the second consumer. This is possible through the asset q, and thus the
long-term asset is more valuable to the ﬁrst agent, which is reﬂected in the lower return
requirement. The opposite distortion —too little investment— occurs if σ > θ.
Proposition 1 If preferences are inconsistent (σ  = θ), the public investment in the long-
term asset does not satisfy the cost beneﬁt rule, i.e., MRSq,3  = R1,3. The equilibrium
return falls short of R1,3 iﬀ σ < θ.
Proof. Above.
We can immediately conclude:
Corollary 1 The equilibrium is not Planner-equivalent if σ  = θ.
13Note that the marginal rate of substitution between q and c3 is independent of weights on utilities,
and therefore there is no need to indicate who’s preferences are in question.
11This conclusion follows from Lemma 1 which shows that the allocation can be inter-
preted as some Planner’s allocation (including the representative Planner) if and only
if the cost-beneﬁt rule holds. Since the equilibrium deviates from the rule, we cannot
ﬁnd positive welfare weights that would support the equilibrium outcome as Pareto ef-
ﬁcient. Let us now consider if the Planner-equivalence can be restored by an exogenous
(institutionalized) cost-beneﬁt requirement.
2.5 Cost-beneﬁt law equilibrium
A simple suggestion for alleviating the eﬃciency loss due to the deviation from the cost-
beneﬁt rule is an intertemporal cost-beneﬁt law requiring that all public investments
should earn the same return as private investments. We impose such a restriction as an
institutional constraint on the equilibrium behavior — it can be thought of as a budget
oﬃce scrutinizing the investment plan at the end of each period. The budget oﬃce has
no preferences, and it simply enforces the cost-beneﬁt requirement, without restricting
the choices of each generation in any other way.
In three periods, the law will constrain only the ﬁrst generation’s choices for con-
sumption and investments in the two purposes. Given the policy function g of the second
generation, the ﬁrst generation maximizes
w1 = u1 + ρ[u2(f2(k2) − g(k2)) + θu3(f3(g(k2)) + θv3(q3)]
subject to the budget equation and the cost-beneﬁt requirement, i.e., eq. (15) restated,
MRSq,3 = R1,3.
While the consumption-based cost-beneﬁt rule (CBR) implies a complicated-looking
constraint on the current actions, there is a simple way to model it. Note that the CBR
reduces the ﬁrst generation’s control of the equilibrium allocation: it can only decide
on the total savings as the cost-beneﬁt rule determines the division savings between the
two assets. Let I denote the total savings by generation 1. Now, when facing savings
I the budget oﬃce needs the imputed equilibrium returns on the two assets in order to
allocate the savings among the two assets such that the CBR is satisﬁed. The imputed
returns depend on generation 2’s policy function, so the budget oﬃce needs to solve
the generation 2 problem to fulﬁll its task of allocating savings for the two purposes.
But as the second generation has no time-inconsistency problem, it therefore cannot
gain by deviating from the cost-beneﬁt rule. The budget oﬃce’s task and the second
12generation’s preferences thus run parallel, and we can interpret the equilibrium as one
where the budget oﬃce at the end of period 1 and the second generation are joined.
Given that the budget oﬃce is known to behave this way, we may then solve for the
equilibrium behavior under the following budget sets:
c1 + I = f1(k1) (22)
c2 + k3 = f2(I − q) (23)
c3 = f3(k3), (24)
where I indicates the overall saving of generation 1, q is the public investment that
the second generation sets apart for the third generation, and k3 is the capital stock
transferred to generation 3. Note that this change in the timing of the decision on public
investment q leaves the production possibility set of the economy unaltered.
The second generation ﬁnds the optimal investments portfolio in the two stocks k2




u2(c2) + σ[u3(c3) + v(q)], (25)























We see therefore immediately that the cost-beneﬁt rule will be satisﬁed, irrespective of
the wealth transfer I from generation 1. This is no surprise because, as pointed out
above, generation 2 has no time-inconsistency problem.
While the CBR restores the “productive eﬃciency” in the public investment, the ﬁrst
generation can still decide on transfer I following its own preferences. It is therefore not
clear whether the CBR restores eﬃciency in terms of welfare. To explore this, consider
conditions (26)-(27) deﬁning generation 2’s policy functions g(I) and h(I) for capital k3
and public investment q, respectively.14 Using the policies, we can write the continuation
value for generation 1 as
V2(I) = u2(f2(I − h(I)) − g(I)) + θu3(f3(g(I))) + θv(h(I))
14By the assumptions made on the primitives of the model, the policy function are continuous, in-
creasing, and diﬀerentiable.
13to obtain the return for investment I as
V
′
























where the latter line follows from using (26)-(27). Note that h′ > 0 and g′ > 0. The ﬁrst
generation balances costs and beneﬁts of the transfer by choosing I to satisfy
u
′
















′)] ≥ 0. (28)
The equilibrium thus puts this implicit value for the utility weight α′ in the Planner’s












so that the implied β
′ is
β





′)] ≥ 0. (30)
We can now state the welfare consequences of the cost-beneﬁt requirement.
Proposition 2 The welfare implications of the institutionalized CBR:
1. The equilibrium with the cost-beneﬁt rule is Planner-equivalent for θ  = σ and θ = σ.
2. The Planner is representative (implements Pareto eﬃciency) if and only if θ = σ.
Proof. We have seen in Lemma 1 that the CBR and the concept of a Planner
are equivalent. Above we constructed the allocation satisfying the cost-beneﬁt rule, and
derived the implied non-negative weights (α′,β
′), without any restrictions on the discount
factors. This proves the ﬁrst item. For the second item, we show that inequalities in
Remark 1 can hold if and only if θ = σ. Thus, only for consistent preferences are the
implied welfare weights non-negative. For inequality (10), note that
α





′)] ≥ ρ ⇔ θ ≥ σ. (31)
For inequality (11), substitute (29) and write
β
′ = σα
′ ≥ ρθ + (α
′ − ρ)σ,
14which simpliﬁes to
σ ≥ θ (32)
We see that (10) and (11) are in contradiction unless θ = σ, a case in which equalities
hold in (31) and (32). If θ > σ, then (31) and thus (10) is satisﬁed but (32) violated. If
θ < σ, then by (31) condition (10) is violated.
It is worth emphasizing why the CBR equilibrium violates Pareto eﬃciency. When
θ > σ, the CBR equilibrium implies that the welfare weight on the last generation is
negative, β < 0. This is intuitive as the ﬁrst generation would like to transfer more
wealth to the last generation but cannot do so due to the CBR. The fact that the ﬁrst
generation is prevented from implementing its altruistic plan for the future distorts the
overall savings below the minimum level that supports Pareto eﬃciency. On the other
hand, if θ < σ, the implied weight on the middle generation is negative, α < 0.
Corollary 2 The CBR does not imply a welfare Pareto improvement vis-a-vis the equi-
librium without the cost-beneﬁt law.
The reason for this result is simple: the cost-beneﬁt law is only a constraint on the
ﬁrst generation, as it could have implemented such a law without consulting the later
generations. Therefore, enforcing the CBR must decrease welfare of the ﬁrst generation
if θ  = σ. If preferences are time-consistent, imposing the CBR has no eﬀect on the
equilibrium. In three periods, generation 1 cannot beneﬁt from the later generations’
adherence to the CBR, and this is one reason to explore the inﬁnite-horizon model in
Section 3. The more general model also facilitates the analysis of self-enforcing savings
rules, and more ﬂexible investments in q rather than direct transfers welfare from the
ﬁrst to the last generation.
2.6 Discussion
The main lessons will carry over to the more general model, so we may discuss some
policy implications after this preliminary analysis. It should ﬁrst be emphasized what
is not implied by the analysis: we do not want to implicate that fully eﬃcient policies
should not satisfy the cost-beneﬁt rule. The cost-beneﬁt requirement is a simple policy
rule to advocate and something that could potentially arise as an “intergenerational
social contract”, characterizing good public governance. We have demonstrated only
that the cost-beneﬁt rule, as a stand-alone rule dictating the allocation of resources
15among alternative uses, cannot internalize all ineﬃciencies when the overall amount of
resources left for the future is open to choice. The core of the welfare ineﬃciency is
that the ﬁrst generation cannot directly transfer income to any but the immediately next
future generation, which is a source of market incompleteness when the agents’ objectives
are incongruent. The institutionalized cost-beneﬁt rule prevents the use of public assets
for altruistic purposes, which then reduces the value of overall savings, thereby adding
to the existing intergenerational welfare-transfer distortion. This key problem of the
cost-beneﬁt rule has already been discussed by Lind (1995), but qualitatively. In order
to beneﬁt all parties the cost-beneﬁt requirement should be accompanied by policy rules
steering the savings rate. While we can think of various “golden rules” for the public
sector ﬁnances (see, e.g., Bassetti and Sargent, 2006), the savings decisions are inherently
private, and it is thus less clear if anything as easy to interpret as a rule as the cost-beneﬁt
check can be devised for savings. However, in Section 3 we discuss such welfare-improving
saving rules.
While we do not provide an explicit political-economy justiﬁcation for the time-
inconsistencies, it is useful to contrast our ﬁndings with some central questions in the
political-economy literature. We often see that restrictions on the set of policies that
democratically elected governments can implement are viewed as welfare-improving; a
prominent example is the European Union public deﬁcit restrictions as stated in the
Maastricht Treaty. On a theory level, Persson and Svensson (1989) show that without
institutional constraints, time-inconsistent preferences lead the current government to
exert control over its successors behavior by running deﬁcits. Tabellini and Alessina
(1990) argue that the lack of current majority’s control over future voters most-preferred
composition of spending tends to create current deﬁcits, as a solution to the commit-
ment problem. More directly related to our setting, Glazer (1987) ﬁnds that uncertainty
of future voting outcomes biases current public investment towards durable long-term
physical capital, and, more normatively, Bassetti and Sargent (2006) argue in favor of
the golden rule where physical long-term public investments should be exempted from
deﬁcit restrictions.
Our results share the positive tone of this literature, as the current public investments
—in the absence of cost-beneﬁt rules— are used to tie the hands of the future agents.
However, on the normative side, we argue against simple behavioral rules eliminating dis-
cretion by the current decision maker as not welfare enhancing. The normative conclusion
we reach is that such rules must be part of a larger package that not only corrects for
distortions in the composition of temporal spending but also in the intertemporal choices
16(i.e., overall savings). Thus, while reasons diﬀer, we concur with Tabellini and Alessina
(1990): “There is a role for institutions that enable society to separate its intertemporal
choices from decisions concerning the allocation of resources within any given period”.
3 Inﬁnite horizon model
3.1 The setting
Consider a sequence of periods t ∈ {1,2,...} where gradual public investments, denoted
by qt ≥ 0, are made to build up a public-asset, denoted by st ≥ 0. The public asset
accumulates as a function of the existing stock st and current investment qt+1 ≥ 0 in the
next-period asset:
st+1 = ϕ(st,qt+1), (33)
where we assume that ϕ(.) is increasing, bounded, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable
in its arguments. This formulation is general enough to allow for multiple interpreta-
tions. The model could be interepreted as a stylized model of education where the future
human capital depends on investments and past levels of the capital, or we can think
of st as public infrastructure where the ﬁnal service depends on the quality of current
infrastructure determined by accumulated investments. Variable st could alternatively
be an index for biodiversity which is maintained by continual eﬀort. In climate change,
st can measure the reduction of the greenhouse-gas stock from a pre-determined level,
and qt+1 is the current abatement eﬀort.
The budget accounting equations between the periods are equation (33) and
ct + kt+1 + qt+1 = f(kt). (34)
In each period, the representative consumer makes the consumption and investment deci-
sions, and derives utility from its own consumption and the public good. The consumer’s
welfare is
wt = u(ct) + v(st) + ρ
X∞
τ=t+1 θ
τ−t−1[uτ(cτ) + vτ(sτ)], (35)
where we identify dynamically consistent preferences by ρ = θ, so that each future period
τ > t is discounted with the same discount factor θ
τ−t. The dynamically inconsistent
preferences are identiﬁed by ρ  = θ, and this model lends itself to the interpretations
suggested by Phelps and Pollak (1968), and Laibson (1997).15 In particular, ρ < θ is
15To obtain the β,δ model, deﬁne β = ρ/θ, δ = θ and indentify inconsistent prefrences by β < 1. We
17consistent with pure altruism towards later decision makers (see Saez-Marti and Weibull
(2005)). We also allow for ρ > θ; it will become clear shortly that ”over-investment” in
the public asset can also occur in this case.
In the equilibrium analysis below we conﬁne attention to Cobb-Douglas production
functions f(kt) = kα
t and ϕ(st,qt+1) = sδ
tq
1−δ
t+1, where 0 < α < 1 and 0 < δ < 1,16
and assume logarithmic utilities for consumption u(ct) = ln(ct) and for the public asset
v(st) = ω ln(st) where ω > 0. The incentive to deviate from the cost-beneﬁt requirement
will depend, in addition to the time-inconsistency parameters, on the relative persistence
of the public asset, i.e., on how large is parameter δ in relation to α and ω.
The equilibrium outcome depends on the restrictions made on the strategies available
(see Krusell et al. 2002, and Karp 2007). To obtain a comparison with the consistent
preferences case (ρ = θ), we impose the diﬀerentiability and symmetry restriction on
the strategies, i.e., each generation is assumed to use the same pair of diﬀerentiable
policy functions kt+1 = g(kt,st), and qt+1 = h(kt,st). Under these assumptions and
the functional forms for production and utility, we can ﬁnd equilibrium strategies where
investments shares 1 > g > 0 and 1 > h > 0 are constant fractions of the output:
kt+1 = gf(kt) (36)
qt+1 = hf(kt). (37)
The stationarity of investment shares is well known for consistent preferences (ρ = θ)
under this speciﬁcation, and we will derive such policies explicitly also for inconsistent
preferences (ρ  = θ).17 Since all policies in the remainder of this paper take the form (36)-
(37), we can make some useful conclusions for this class of policies before the equilibrium
analysis in Section 3.2.
Given (35), we can express the equilibrium welfare as
wt = u(ct) + v(st) + ρV (kt+1,st+1), (38)
where the (auxiliary) value function satisﬁes
V (kt,st) = u((1 − g − h)f(kt)) + v(st) + θV (gf(kt),ϕ(st,hf(kt))).
want to indentify inconsistencies by ρ  = θ to maintain an easy comparison with the three period model;
we can even think of ”short-sighted preferences”, with ρ > 0, θ = 0, where the current generation cares
about the immediate future, but not about those in the future further away.
16We follow the custom use of α for the capital-output elasticity. When using time subscripts, the αt
refer to welfare weights while α′
t refer to utility weights.
17We do not consider non-linear symmetric stationary strategies; on that, see Karp (2007). Moreover,
there could be equilibria in symmetric but non-stationary strategies.
18We derive in the Appendix18 the parametric form for the value function, applying to all
equilibria considered in this paper:
Lemma 3 The value function implied by policies (36)-(37) has the following parametric
form
V (kt+1,st+1) = ξ ln(kt+1) +
ζ
1 − δ
ln(st+1) + θµ[ξ ln(g) + ζ ln(h)] + µln(1 − g − h)
where ξ,ζ,µ > 0 are parameters independent of ρ.
The Lemma is very useful as it immediately establishes some important features of any
equilibrium with constant investment shares. Notice that g and h in the value function
refer to the future investment shares, from period t+1 onwards. The variables kt+1 and
st+1 are the current choices. There is no interaction between g,h, and kt+1,st+1, so that
the current optimal choices of kt+1 and st+1 are independent of future investment shares
g and h. As ln(st+1) = δ ln(st)+(1−δ)ln(qt+1), and one unit of investment in kt+1 should
yield the same marginal value as one unit investment in qt+1, the Lemma shows that the
current investment ratio (maximizing wt in (38)) is a constant given by kt+1/qt+1 = ξ/ζ
which is independent of the short-term time-preference parameter ρ (see Appendix for
the expressions of the parameters ξ and ζ). The shares g∗ and h∗ maximizing the value
function also satisfy g∗/h∗ = ξ/ζ, implying that current investment shares line up with a
time-consistent planner with time-discount factor equal to the agent’s long-term factor θ.
The short-run time preference ρ determines the overall savings, but the division between
investment opportunities is determined by the long-run preference θ.
The cost-beneﬁt rule equates the utility-weighted returns on investments in k and
s, i.e., the cost-beneﬁt ratio (CBR) equals unity. In Appendix we derive this condition
generally and show that it can be expressed for any (g,h)−policy as follows:
Remark 2 The inﬁnite-horizon cost-beneﬁt rule for policies of the form (36)-(37) is
1 =
h(α − δg)
gω(1 − δ)(1 − g − h)
= CBR. (39)
Pareto eﬃcient investment shares g and h must satisfy rule (39), but the rule can also
hold for some other (g,h)−policy, as we will see shortly. In this inﬁnite-horizon setting,
a Planner-equivalent outcome is, as in Barro (1999), an allocation that would be optimal
for some consistent-preference decision-maker. Such an allocation must satisfy (39) and
18All proofs not in the text are in the Appendix.
19it must also imply a geometric discount factor that, if applied, would justify the choices
for the ﬁctitious Planner. Given the allocation, the “equilibrium discount factor” can be




















where Rt,t+1 is the compound rate for capital and the last step uses ct/kt+1 = (1−g−h)/g.
When γ < 1, we can view γ as the discount factor for the Planner choosing the
allocation, so that γt−1 are the Planner’s utility weights for periods t ≥ 1. More precisely,
we can state:
Lemma 4 An equilibrium with γ = g/α < 1 is Planner-equivalent if and only if the
cost-beneﬁt rule (39) holds.
When observing a constant investment share equilibrium satisfying the cost-beneﬁt
rule, the result implies that there is a Planner associated with it, but how to verify if the
Planner is representative, i.e., chooses a Pareto eﬃcient outcome? The answer turns out
to be simple:
Lemma 5 The Planner with γ = g/α < 1 is representative if and only if γ ≥ max{ρ,θ}.
In the Appendix, we use the lower bound on the “equilibrium discount factor” γ, i.e.
the condition γ ≥ max{ρ,θ}, to show that the welfare weights remain positive, and also
that only in this case such weights can be found. Intuitively, γ can be seen as the discount
factor that makes the ﬁrst generation look like a consistent-preferences Planner; when
this Planner puts a per-period weight factor larger than ρ and θ on each generation’s
utility, then the implied equilibrium utility weights are large enough to leave room for
positive welfare weights. It is not obvious whether this can hold in equilibrium — in
particular so when the cost-beneﬁt requirement is imposed as a rule of the game.
3.2 Equilibrium
Given the background from the previous section, it is now straightforward to assess the
eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium. Considering the symmetric equilibrium where
each period representative consumer chooses the same pair (g,h), we can readily see the
20continuation value for each investment level from Lemma 3, and determine the equilib-
rium investment shares g and h from the ﬁrst-order conditions for kt+1 and qt+1,
u
′(ct) = ρVk(kt+1,st+1), (41)
u
′(ct) = ρϕqt+1Vs(kt+1,st+1). (42)
Given the functional form from Lemma 3, the equilibrium best-responses (41) and (42)
can be written as
kt+1 = ρξct (43)
qt+1 = ρζct. (44)
Using kt+1/qt+1 = g/h and ct/kt+1 = (1−g−h)/g together with (43)-(44), we can express
the equilibrium policies as follows (using the expressions for ξ and ζ in Appendix):
g =
ρξ
1 + ρζ + ρξ
= ρα
1 − δθ + θω(1 − δ)




1 + ρζ + ρξ
= ρω
(1 − αθ)(1 − δ)
1 − δθ + ρω(1 − δ) + α(1 − δθ)(ρ − θ)
. (46)
We see that when preferences are time-consistent (θ = ρ), the equilibrium investment in
k has the familiar form g = αρ, and the equilibrium discount factor is, as it should, γ =
g
α = ρ < 1. When preferences are time-inconsistent (θ  = ρ), we can obtain the intuitive
result that the equilibrium discount factor is between the two conceivable extremes:
Lemma 6 For all ρ  = θ, the equilibrium policy g satisﬁes
min{ρ,θ} < γ =
g
α
< max{ρ,θ} < 1.
The reasoning for this result (formally proved in the Appendix) is straightforward.
The current agent cares more for total future welfare, and thus saves more, than a repre-
sentative planner who would have consistent preferences with discount factor satisfying
γ = min{ρ,θ}. At the same time, the current agent cares less, and saves less, compared
to a representative planner who would have consistent preferences with γ = max{ρ,θ}.
Clearly, the equilibrium savings must be somewhere between the extremes.
We can now describe the equilibrium outcome as depending on the inconsistency of
the preferences and the relative persistency of the public asset. For ease of exposition,
21we use CBR as a shorthand for the cost-beneﬁt ratio, expressed on the right-hand side
of the cost-beneﬁt rule (39). We plug in the equilibrium policies (45) and (46) to (39) to
obtain:
CBR = 1 +
(θ − ρ)(δ(1 + ω) − α − ω)
(1 − θδ) + (1 − δ)θω
.
This is a closed form expression for the equilibrium cost-beneﬁt ratio, implying:
Proposition 3 Returns on public investments fall short of returns on capital (CBR > 1)
in equilibrium if and only if (θ − ρ)(δ − α+ω
1+ω) > 0. The equilibrium is Planner-equivalent
if and only if either (i) θ = ρ, or (ii) δ =
α+ω
1+ω.
The proof is a matter of straightforward veriﬁcation. The latter part follows by the
equivalence of the Planner and the cost-beneﬁt rule (CBR = 1) that we explicated in
Lemma 4. While the equilibrium deviation from the cost-beneﬁt rule is not surprising
given our arguments from three periods, the result gives more structure to the determi-
nants of the deviation. In particular, since the commitment provided by the public asset
depends on its persistence relative to the traditional capital, the degree of over- or under-
investment depends not only on preferences but also on persistence. A large long-term
discount factor (θ > ρ) was previously shown to be a reason for over-investment (i.e.,
costs exceeding beneﬁts, CBR > 1), but now the public asset should also be persistent
enough to satisfy δ > α+ω
1+ω. Otherwise, the agent will under-invest in the public asset.
When preferences are time-consistent (θ = ρ), the cost-beneﬁt rule will hold and, of
course, it is possible to associate a Planner with the allocation, i.e., we can think that
the dynastic ﬁrst-period agent is the Planner. But this outcome also arises when the
persistence of the public asset exactly matches the persistence of welfare transferred to
future generations through capital (δ = α+ω
1+ω), i.e., the equilibrium can be interpreted
as a Planner’s allocation, irrespective of the structure of time preferences (ρ = θ, and
ρ  = θ). This result sheds light on the generality of the observational equivalence between
the equilibrium outcome and that obtained under consistent preferences, pointed out by
Barro (1999). With more than one capital good, the observational equivalence follows
only in the knife-edge case identiﬁed here.
The Planner-equivalence does not imply welfare eﬃciency, however. Lemma 6 implies
that the exponential decrease in utility weights γ associated with the equilibrium is too
large.
Proposition 4 Suppose preferences are inconsistent, θ  = ρ, but δ = α+ω
1+ω so that the
equilibrium is Planner-equivalent. This Planner is not representative, i.e., Pareto eﬃ-
ciency is not achieved.
22Eﬃciency requires γ ≥ max{ρ,θ} but this contradicts Lemma 6 above. The result
thus implies that the equilibrium can never reach Pareto eﬃciency when preferences are
dynamically inconsistent. This result is not surprising; while the equilibrium satisﬁes
temporal eﬃciency in the sense that the composition of investments is optimal, the
overall savings still deviate from the eﬃcient savings for the reasons known from the one
capital-good Ramsey saving problems with hyperbolic preferences.
3.3 Cost-beneﬁt law equilibrium
We consider now whether the cost-beneﬁt law, similar to that studied in three-periods,
can improve welfare. We assume that the cost-beneﬁt requirement is an institutional
constraint dictating that all public investments must earn the same return as capital
investments. As in three periods, we may think that the requirement is implemented
administratively, e.g., through a budget oﬃce scrutinizing the investment plan at the
end of each period. Other than this per-period check on the composition of spending,
each generation is free to choose, within the resource constraints, the overall level of
investment and consumption. With inﬁnite horizon, the welfare implications of the cost-
beneﬁt law are less obvious than in three periods, as the current generation can potentially
beneﬁt from the future generations’ adherence to the law — in three periods we could
not address the full dynamic potential of the cost-beneﬁt law, as it was only binding for
the ﬁrst generation by construction.
Formally, we consider a game where each generation chooses investments kt+1 and qt+1
subject to the constraint that the cost-beneﬁt ratio must equal unity (CBR = 1), and
the restriction on strategies that each future generation applies a constant investment
share policy. We can think of each period involving two steps. In the ﬁrst, the agent
decides only on the overall investment It+1 = kt+1 +qt+1 and, in the second, the amount
It+1 is divided between the two purposes such that CBR = 1 is satisﬁed, understanding
that each future generation will follow the same procedure.
Since we are focusing on the constant investment share policies, and the cost-beneﬁt
rule (39) was derived for any such policy, we can solve for the investment shares from










The left-hand side refers to current investment decisions, and the right hand side refers to
future investment decisions that are considered as given by the future agents’ strategies
23in the subgame-perfect equilibrium. By deﬁnition, η is the share of the public asset
investment in total investments It+1. Given the future policies, we only need to consider
the best-response today for total savings It+1, as the shares follow by kt+1 = (1−η)It+1,












) = 0 (47)
We have derived the form for the value function for any pair of (g,h)-policies, so we can
readily assess the implications of the cost-beneﬁt rule on total savings:
Remark 3 The cost-beneﬁt law does not change total investments, but only the shares
of capital and the public good. Investment in the public good decreases if and only if
(θ − ρ)(δ − α+ω
1+ω) > 0
Formally, we can see the ﬁrst part of the result from the ﬁrst-order condition (47)
which, given Lemma 3, can be restated as
It+1 = ρ(ξ + ζ)ct, (48)
or, by It+1 =
g+h
1−g−hct,
g + h =
ρξ + ρζ
1 + ρζ + ρξ
.
which equals the equilibrium total savings implied by (45) and (46). This result is already
indicative of the fact that the cost-beneﬁt requirement alone cannot deliver a Pareto
eﬃcient outcome, as it does not correct for the distortions in overall savings. For the
second part, note that in this equilibrium we must have CBR = 1 so that, if CBR > 1,
the public-asset investment share declines when compared to the equilibrium without the
cost-beneﬁt rule, see Proposition 3.19 Thus, the cost-beneﬁt law either pulls resources
away from public investment or towards it, depending on the relative persistence of the
public asset and preference inconsistencies.
The cost-beneﬁt law restores productive eﬃciency in the sense that all assets earn
seemingly appropriate returns, so that by observing such an outcome we might conclude
that eﬃciency has been achieved. However, in levels the outcome is ineﬃcient due to the
fact that there are distortions in savings, when preferences are inconsistent:
Proposition 5 If ρ  = θ, the cost-beneﬁt law equilibrium is not Pareto eﬃcient.
19The cost-beneﬁt ratio in (39) strictly decreases in h when g + h remains constant, as is the case in
this comparison.
24We can verify the result by noting that the law implements a Planner-equivalent
outcome with discount factor γ < 1. Such an economy grows by investing fraction
g = αγ of the output in capital k. The equilibrium ﬁrst-order condition for capital
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(1 − αγ)(1 − δγ)
],
where the right-hand side is the Planner’s version of the ratio. However, if γ ≥ max{ρ,θ},
the equation cannot hold (the right-hand side is larger). Thus, we must have γ <
max{ρ,θ} and, by Lemma 5, Pareto eﬃciency is not achieved, so the Planner is not
representative.
While the cost-beneﬁt law does not restore full eﬃciency, it might be argued that the
productive ineﬃciency removed produces at least a Pareto improvement. However, not
even this can be achieved:
Proposition 6 The implementation of the cost-beneﬁt law from period t onwards implies
a welfare loss for generation t, compared to the equilibrium without the law.
The result shows that the three period conclusion extends to the inﬁnite horizon:
the ﬁrst generation under the law cannot suﬃciently beneﬁt from the later generations’
adherence to the law. Yet, the cost-beneﬁt rule may create some overall economic surplus
in the future, that could be used to support more complicated behavioral strategies for
distributing the surplus, thereby supporting the rule as an equilibrium outcome without
imposing it as an institutional constraint. For this reason, we study whether there are
eﬃciency gains in the long-run. In the Appendix we provide the proof for the next
proposition, which show that there is no long-run eﬃciency gain: welfare strictly decreases
if preferences are quasi-hyperbolic.
Proposition 7 The cost-beneﬁt law decreases the steady-state welfare if θ > ρ.
The illustration after the next section provides a quantitative assessment of the steady
state losses as well as gains from focusing on savings-based rules that we consider next.
253.4 Eﬃcient saving rules
The cost-beneﬁt rule generates no social value because it does not solve the source of
the allocation problem, namely the distortion in the inter-generational income transfer.
Savings rules, which directly target income transfers, might be more eﬀective in achieving
eﬃciency gains. Indeed, we ﬁnd that if distortions in savings can be corrected, the cost-
beneﬁt rule will be self-fulﬁlling, i.e., there is no need to make it institutionalized. This
observation corroborates the conclusion that the “cost-beneﬁt commitment” as such has
no social value. To illustrate, assume now altruistic (i.e., quasi-hyperbolic) preferences,
θ > ρ, and consider Pareto eﬃciency which requires Planner-equivalence and also that
the Planner’s equilibrium discount factor, denoted by γ above, is at least equal to θ (see
Lemma 5). This tells us that minimal Pareto-eﬃcient savings satisfy g = αγ = αθ. To
determine the Pareto eﬃcient investments in the public asset, we consider the investment
plans (45) and (46) and adjust these so that they are in line with a representative Planner
with discount factor θ, that is, we substitute θ for ρ everywhere. This gives g = αθ, and
h/g = ζ/ξ. Minimal Pareto-eﬃcient savings thus require:20




If such a policy on overall savings g +h could be written into a law, then all generations
would voluntarily choose to follow the cost-beneﬁt rule: the socially optimal division
of savings for private and public uses lines up with preferences of each generation (see
the discussion below Lemma 3). The result underscores the fundamental nature of the
long-term cost-beneﬁt problem: when savings are socially optimal, decision-makers have
no need to look for commitment devices, and the investment biases disappear. However,
Pareto eﬃciency may not be self-enforcing, i.e., it need not be in the interest of any gen-
eration to set a law that implements Pareto eﬃciency if their own welfare decreases. Let
us now consider savings-investment rules that are self-enforcing. Let the ﬁrst generation
propose an investment rule (b g,b h) that would serve its own interests, understanding that
the rule needs to satisfy all future generations’ incentive constraints, i.e., they would
not beneﬁt from deviating to the benchmark equilibrium where no rules apply. Con-
sider the welfare of generation t depending on the assets received (kt,st) and investment
shares (g,h) that are constants from period t onwards. Substituting the value function
in Lemma 3 to the welfare in (38), we ﬁnd welfare wt for generation t as a function of
20Notice that if savings are set above the minimal value, so that γ > θ, then the associated investment
shares for private and public capital do not equal ξ and ζ.








1 + ρ − θ + ρξ + ρζ
. (50)
Note that these are just the previous SPE shares with an additional term in the de-
nominator, ρ − θ < 0, so that investments in both assets increase; we ﬁnd the privately
optimal investment shares to lie between the benchmark equilibrium shares and the
Pareto-eﬃcient shares (inequalities mirror when θ < ρ):21
g
BAU < b g < g
PE and h
BAU < b h < h
PE iﬀ θ > ρ.
Similar to the Pareto eﬃcient investment shares, the investment ratio between the two
assets b g/b h is consistent with private preferences of each generation, so that the rule only
needs to specify total savings b g + b h, and it can leave the division over investments to
each generation’s discretion. Moreover, the rule optimizes welfare of generation t, but
as the same rule optimizes welfare for all future generations, subsequently, no generation
beneﬁts from deviation, understanding that a deviation triggers a fall of future savings
back to the benchmark levels.
The self-enforcing savings rule is clearly a Pareto improvement but yet it does not
imply full satisfaction of the cost-beneﬁt rule – as the total savings still fall short of the
ﬁrst best, the commitment value of the long-term asset is used also in this equibrium.
To assess the deviation, we plug the equilibrium policies (49)-(50) to the right-hand
side of the cost-beneﬁt rule (39) to obtain the following expression for the self-enforcing
cost-beneﬁt ratio:
[ CBR = 1 +
(θ − ρ)(δ(1 + ω) − α − ω)
(1 − θδ) + (1 − δ)θω
(
1 − θ
1 + ρ − θ
).
The description of Proposition 3 applies also in this equilibrium but, for given parameters,
the departure from the eﬃcient cost-beneﬁt ratio (CBR = 1) is reduced, as (1−θ)/(1+
ρ − θ) < 1. This reﬂects again the fact that savings rules reduce the need for using
long-term assets as commitment. This eﬀect will show clearly in the illustration.
21b g < gPE follows from gPE =
θξ
1+θξ+θζ
273.5 Illustration: climate policies
To see whether some ballpark numbers can make the losses from the cost-beneﬁt law vis-
ible as well as the potential gains from focusing on savings directly, we carry out a simple
exercise where we consider the climate system as public asset. While the formulation is
too simple to capture the dynamics of the climate problem, we nevertheless believe the
illustration delivers an important and novel insight on the “climate-policy ramp” discus-
sion that followed the Stern Review (2006), i.e., whether an initially moderate reduction
eﬀort is optimal followed by a gradual increase in eﬀorts when the global carbon stock
increases, or whether we should aim for immediate and high emission reduction targets.
At the heart of the debate is the choice of the discount rate that depends primarily
on the rate of pure time-preference and on the consumption-smoothing preferences as-
sumed (see Nordhaus 2007, and Weitzman 2007). Assuming the same parametric forms
as in the above analysis, we use the structure to interpret the main opposing views in
the “climate-policy ramp” discussion, and then proceed to the illustration of the cost-
beneﬁt law and savings-rule equilibria; these two policy cases match the opposing views
remarkably well.22
We thus consider the case where one must choose between investments in capital or
in a very durable public asset (the climate system). Assuming time steps of 20 years we
may treat the neoclassical capital as a broad man-made stock, possibly including human
capital, that is fully depreciated in one period. We set the output-capital elasticity equal
to α = 0.5. The public asset represents the accumulated reduction of the atmospheric
greenhouse-gas stock relative to a benchmark (business as usual) path in which no eﬀorts
are undertaken to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. The climate systems evolves slowly;
the uptake of antropogenic emissions implies that atmospheric CO2 particles depreciate
approximately at 0.5 per cent per year. The persistence of the public asset of 99.5% per
year implies δ = 0.9. Let us assume that the true preferences are such that the agents
discount short-term utility at an annual rate of 2.5 per cent, implying ρ = 0.5, but they
do not diﬀerentiate much between periods beyond the ﬁrst 20 years; we set θ = 0.95.
The business as usual (BAU) scenario is the one where the markets for private capital
work well, but the public good is undersupplied. As we think of our public-good stock as
the diﬀerence between the BAU and actual equilibrium greenhouse-gas stocks, the BAU
public-good stock is zero. The BAU equilibrium is then deﬁned by setting ω = 0, giving
22We notice that the parametric form of our model implies constant investment shares, so that short-
run and long-run policies are symmetric, but the dynamic structure of the capital and public assets build
up will cause substantial diﬀerences between short and long-term eﬀects.
28g = 0.323 (see eq. (45)), roughly consistent with the historical empirical data on gross
investment rates (Mankiw et al. 1992). We now develop two simple policy experiments
based on this BAU benchmark, following the approach that has been associated with
Nordhaus’ and Stern’s previous studies, respectively. In the ﬁrst experiment, which we
label “positive discounting”,23 we interpret the historically observed BAU equilibrium
as a time-consistent preferences equilibrium (see also Barro (1999) for the observational
equivalence), and, by presuming ρ = θ = γ, determine the time preference factor by our
version of the Ramsey savings-rule, (40) as γ = g/α = 0.658. The pure time discount
factor is equivalent to an annual rate of pure time preference of .658−0.05 − 1 = 0.021,
broadly in line with Nordhaus (2007). According to these assumptions, the optimal policy
does not imply changes in investments in the capital stock, i.e. g = 0.323, while public
policy will set investments in the public asset at a level h = 0.010, if we assume ω = 0.1
(we keep ω set at this level from now on). That is, according to this interpretation of
preferences, 1 per cent of global income should be used to preserve the environment, i.e.,
to reduce the atmospheric greenhouse-gas stock.
variable BAU positive discounting prescriptive discounting
g .323 .323 .475
h 0 .010 .032
γ .658 .658 .95
Table 1: Investment shares (g, h) and equilibrium discount factor (γ), for the business
as usual (BAU), “positive discounting”, and “prescriptive” equilibria, for parameters
α = .5, ω = .1, δ = .9, ρ = .5, θ = .95.
In the “prescriptive discounting” experiment, the argument is that the historically
observed savings behavior does not reveal our true long-term preferences, which rather
should be approximated by the discount factor θ = 0.95. As shown in Table 1, gross
savings in capital jump to g = .475 and the public-good investments about triple to
h = .032. The discount factor is, of course, θ = γ = 0.95 corresponding to an annual
rate of pure time preference of 0.0025. We notice that such a design for public policy is
in the Pareto set for the true preferences (see Section 3.4), but it may be argued that the
outcome is not realistic; a gross investment rate above 50 per cent cannot be supported
23We use the terms positive and prescriptive as common in this literature. In our context, employing
the time-inconsistent preference structure could also be considered a positive approach to discounting.
29by preferences with short-term annual discount rate of 2.5 per cent, a criticism often
presented against Stern’s (2006) choice of parameters.24
Three alternatives to the “positive discounting” and “prescriptive discounting” ex-
periments become clear from our analysis, and these are reported in Table 2 for the same
set of parameters. One policy design is based on the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE)
where the planner is aware of the time-inconsistency problems implied by the preferences,
and chooses optimal investments both in capital and greenhouse-gas stock reductions that
maximize welfare taking into account the anticipated future policy choices. We ﬁnd the
SPE investment share in capital to remain almost in the same order as under positive dis-
counting, g = 0.329, but the public-good investment share doubles to the level h = 0.022.
The equilibrium policy leaves capital investments almost unchanged, but substantially
increases climate investments as preference-inconsistencies motivate the use of the persis-
tent climate asset for channeling wealth to the future. Consequently, and consistent with
our analytical results, the cost-beneﬁt ratio is over 2, implying that each dollar invested
in climate mitigation yields a net present value beneﬁt of less than half a dollar.
variable benchmark SPE cost-beneﬁt law self-enforcing savings
g .329 .340 .465
h .022 .011 .032
γ .658 .680 .929
CBR 2.14 1 1.10
EV SS 0 −3.1% 17.5%
Table 2: Investment shares (g, h), equilibrium discount factor (γ), the cost-beneﬁt ratio
(CBR), and the steady-state equivalent variation (EV SS), for the benchmark subgame-
perfect, cost-beneﬁt law, and self-enforcing savings equilibrium for parameters α = .5,
ω = .1, δ = .9, ρ = .5, θ = .95.
As the SPE investments in the public good are so far oﬀ the eﬃcient cost-beneﬁt ratio,
it is natural to consider next the policy scenario that imposes the cost-beneﬁt require-
ment. Consider thus implementing the cost-beneﬁt law, as we have done throughout the
analysis of this paper, and see Table 2 again. This policy diverts part of the resources
from the public asset towards the capital stock, and the equilibrium investment in capital
increases somewhat while the investment share of the public good returns to about the
24See Dasgupta (2008) for a succinct elaboration of this criticism.
30same level as in the positive discounting experiment, h = 0.011. This reﬂects the idea
that high capital opportunity costs renders immediate large investments in the climate






















Figure 1: Left: Capital accumulation paths for the benchmark subgame-perfect (kSPE),
cost-beneﬁt law (kCBR), and self-enforcing savings-rule equilibrium (kself−en). Right:
Corresponding public-good stocks. Unit of time is 20 years. Parameters from Table 1.
The ﬁnal policy scenario, in the last column of the Table 2, presents the self-
enforcing savings rule. We see jump-start investments in the public good, h = 0.032, but
investments in the traditional capital increase as well. As the public planner can line-
up present and future gross savings as a result of the savings rule, the optimal level of
overall savings implies a modest .36 per cent annual pure rate of discount. Importantly,
since both assets increase, the ex post cost-beneﬁt ratio nears one. The self-enforcing
equilibrium is observationally close to the prescriptive discounting experiment. Both
policies have noticeable accumulative implications on the equilibrium paths, which we
consider next.
Figure 1 provides a vivid illustration of the diﬀerences between the equilibria over
time and of the implications for the “policy-ramp”. For illustration of the transitions,
the paths start with capital and public assets at 10 per cent of the SPE steady state
level. It takes about 5 periods of 20 years for the capital stock to converge to its long-
run level. The public asset takes much longer to converge, consistent with the climate
31change literature. A comparison between the solid- (SPE) and dotted-line (CBR) paths
shows what the simple cost-beneﬁt rule does: it shifts resources from the public-good
stock s (the reduction of the atmospheric carbon stock) towards the traditional capital
k. This reﬂects the notion that private assets oﬀer a better opportunity to contribute
to future welfare compared to public assets, when costs of public investments exceed the
net present value beneﬁts. But welfare is lower under the cost-beneﬁt law equilibrium for
all generations (see Proposition 6 for the ﬁrst generation, and Proposition 7 for the long
run). In this illustration, the change in welfare is equivalent to a drop of about 3 per cent
of consumption (see the last line of Table 2).25 The dashed lines show that the assets
are made complementary by the savings rule: both the capital and public assets increase
relative to the other paths. In this sense, the jump-start climate policies need not come
at the expense of the capital accumulation path. For all generations welfare is highest
in the self-enforcing savings equilibrium, and in the long run is equivalent to a 17.5 per
cent increase in consumption (Table 2). If an increase in aggregate savings is infeasible,
then in welfare terms the SPE equilibrium performs substantially better compared to the
cost-beneﬁt rule equilibrium.
4 Concluding remarks
Public investments are often extremely long term by nature. Due to the long time
horizon and diﬃculties in evaluating the future beneﬁts, they present a challenge to the
traditional cost-beneﬁt analysis. We introduced a diﬀerent complication: if preferences
are known to be time-inconsistent such that the future ranking of current public decisions
will be diﬀerent from that today, how should the principles of the CBA be altered? We
found that the persistence of the eﬀects of current decisions lead to incentives to deviate
from the standard cost-beneﬁt requirements. Almost by deﬁnition public investments
provide commitment to current preferences, and it makes sense to use this commitment
to overcome the inconsistencies in public decision making over time.
We found no normative reason to insist on the use of stand-alone cost-beneﬁt rules
when preferences are inconsistent: the overall welfare is not maximized under such rules.
The cost-beneﬁt analysis is based on a narrow concept of eﬃciency, and imposing the
cost-beneﬁt rule does not even imply a Pareto improvement, let alone achievement of
welfare Pareto eﬃciency.
One extension of the current inﬁnite-horizon model is a more detailed application to
25The steady-state equivalent variation calculation is demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 7.
32education, energy, or climate change, e.g., by using a numerical integrated assessment
model (IAM) linking the economy and the climate development. Based on our results on
observational equivalence between consistent and inconsistent preferences equilibria, we
can conjecture that a standard IAM solution can also be interpreted as an equilibrium
resulting from inconsistent preferences with an enforced cost-beneﬁt rule. One can then
explore with little eﬀort the welfare loss from pursuing the cost-beneﬁt rules (typically
justiﬁed by a consistent preference framework) if the true underlying preferences are in
fact inconsistent.
On a theory level, a natural alternative formulation is one where the current govern-
ment understands that the future preferences are likely to be diﬀerent but is unsure in
which way. Alternatively, one may want to consider more deeply the source of incon-
sistency in public decision making. For example, it is well known that aggregation over
individual heterogenous discount factors leads to average discount rates that decline with
the time horizon (Weitzman 2000, Gollier and Zeckhauser 2005). As such this is not a
source inconsistency in decentralized economy with heterogenous but consistent agents
(Lengwiler 2005). However, in public decision making one may be forced to aggregate
over individuals such that inconsistencies arise. We leave these interesting questions open
for future research.
Appendix
Value function: Lemma 3
We proceed in the following steps. First, we show that there are parameters ξ,ζ,ag,ah,µ
such that the value function can be written as
Vt = ξ ln(kt) +
ζ
1 − δ
ln(st) + ag ln(g) + ah ln(h) + µln(1 − g − h). (51)
Then we analyze how ag and ah relate to the other parameters.
Given stationary investment shares, we can fully calculate all forward capital and
public good levels. We use tildes to denote log-variables. The stock dynamics can then
be written recursively as
e kt+1 = e g + αe kt,
e st+1 = δe st + (1 − δ)(e h + αe kt).
33Substitution allows us to ﬁnd the complete future path of stocks kt and st as a function
of initial stocks k1 and s1, and the policy functions:





e st+τ = δ
τe st + (1 − δ











We can write equation (53) as
e st+τ = δ
τe st + (1 − δ













Now, we observe that using logarithms denoted by a tilde, we have ut = e ct = ln(1 −








ln(1 − g − h) + α
P∞
τ=0 θ




Looking at (52) and (53) implies that the value function has the general parametric form





























(1 − θα)(1 − θδ)
= α
1 + ωθ − δθ − ωδθ
(1 − αθ)(1 − δθ)
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We now want to determine ag and ah. As above, we could directly calculate the coeﬃ-
cients by summing all terms over time, but we can also derive the coeﬃcients by a more
subtle reasoning. For time consistent preferences, ρ = θ, we can calculate the investment
shares g∗ = kt+1/yt and h∗ = qt+1/yt that maximize










1 + θξ + θζ
.









µ + ag + ah
.
It follows directly that ag = µθξ and ah = µθζ.
Remark 2
Consider allocation (c,q,k) = {ct,qt,kt}∞






for some utility weights α′
t ≥ 0, satisfying
P∞
t=1 α′
t < ∞. Let us use the short-hand
notation ϕq,t+1 = ϕq(st,qt+1) and ϕs,t+1 = ϕs(st,qt+1), and let Rt,τ = f′
t+1   f′
t+2   ...   f′
τ
be the compound rate of return for k, and Jt+1,τ = ϕs,t+1   ϕs,t+2   ...   ϕs,τ the compound
rate of return for the public asset (Jt+1,t+1 ≡ 1). We prove ﬁrst the following result:


























This conditions holds between any two periods with positive investment, implying that










where Rt,τ = f′
t+1  f′
t+2  ...   f′
τ is the compound rate of return for k. On the other hand,


































The expression on the right gives the beneﬁt-cost ratio for a marginal increase in the
public asset. The beneﬁt from the investment q is the increase in the next period public
asset stock ϕq,t+1 times the sum of the utility-weighted compound returns Jt+1,τv′
τ in
periods τ ≥ t+ 1. The cost of the investment is the current utility loss which equals the
return on capital investment k. To obtain an expression that does not depend on utility
weights, we can replace α′
tu′
t with (56) to obtain expression (54).

































(1 − g − h)ωkτ+1
gsτ
(59)


































ω(1 − δ)(1 − g − h)
(α − δg)
. (63)
Line (58) follows from the deﬁnition of ϕq,t+1 and the state equation for st+1 together









Line (59) uses gcτ = (1 − g − h)kτ+1. Line (60) follows by simpliﬁcation. Line (61) uses
kt+1/st+1 = g/h. Line (63) uses the boundedness of the policy assumption.
Lemma 4
Allocation (c,q,k) = {ct,qt,kt}∞







36for some utility weights α′
t ≥ 0, satisfying
P∞
t=1 α′
t < ∞. In the text, we constructed
α′
t = γt−1 as the equilibrium utility weights from the Euler equation for consumption.
We prove the necessecity and suﬃciency of the cost-beneﬁt rule by proving the following:
Lemma 7 The strictly positive allocation (c,q,k) with lim
t→∞
ct+1
ctRt,t+1 < 1 is Planner-
equivalent if and only if the cost-beneﬁt ratio (54) holds in all periods.










t , the condition lim
t→∞
ct+1
ctRt,t+1 < 1 ensures
the bounded mass condition
P∞
t=1 α′
t < ∞, and if ﬁrst-order conditions are satisﬁed,
the allocation must be Planner equivalent. Consider then the only-if -part, and opti-
mal utility sequence {u∗
t + v∗
t}t≥1 that maximizes U(c,q,k). Strict concavity of utility







t + ∆t}t≥1 is infeasible as utility sequence. For
P∞
t=1 α′
t∆t < 0, there is a ε > 0
such that u∗+v∗+ε∆ is feasible as utility vector. We notice that the ﬁrst order condition
for kt+1 deﬁnes the (direction of) perturbations dct,dct+1,dkt+1 that are consistent with
perturbations in utility pairs (dut,dut+1) such that α′
tdut + α′
t+1dut+1 = 0. That is, if
we have a ∆t with
P∞
t=1 α′
t∆t < 0, then we can construct a sequence of perturbations
dct,dkt+1 such that the associated change in utility satisﬁes dut ≥ ε∆t.
If the ﬁrst-order condition for qt is not met, then there is a feasible perturbation dqt,(dsτ)∞
τ=t+1





τdvτ > 0. Now take
∆t = −dut, and ∆τ = −dvτ, and we thus construct a perturbation dct,dkt+1 such that
the associated change in utility satisﬁes duτ ≥ ε∆τ for τ = t,...,∞. If we now add ε
times the perturbation in qt,(sτ)∞
τ=t+1, we have a feasible perturbation that substitutes
capital for public investment, or other way around, and that strictly increases the utility
path.
As our (g,h)−policy satisﬁes the condition in the Lemma, the result is proved.
Lemma 5




with non-negative welfare weights αt having a bounded mass
P∞
t=1 αt < ∞, then the
allocation is Pareto eﬃcient and welfare aggregator W(c,q,k) is the objective of a rep-
resentative Planner.
37The equilibrium implies geometric utility weights α′
t = γt−1. If γ < ρ or γ < θ
one cannot construct a sequence of non-negative welfare weights αt consistent with the
sequence of utility weights α′
t. Suppose the contrary, that welfare weights αt ≥ 0 consis-
tent with α′
t exist. Then, using the deﬁnition of welfare, we see that for some τ > t, the
relationship between the two is α′










τ−3 + ... + ατ−1ρ + ατ. (64)
If γ < θ and α1 > 0, we see that the equation cannot hold with ατ ≥ 0 for suﬃciently
large τ. If γ < ρ, we can write from (64)
α
′




τ − ρατ ≥ ατ+1.
Again, since γ < ρ, this cannot hold with ατ+1 ≥ 0 for suﬃciently large τ.
Consider now γ ≥ max{ρ,θ}. We show that now one can construct the non-negative
welfare weights. We construct an algorithm for ﬁnding the weights. Let e α1 = {α1
τ}τ≥1,
e α2 = {α2






















The value of αt
τ measures the weight remaining for generation τ after all altruistic weights
of generations 1 to t − 1 have been subtracted. Note that the equilibrium implies utility
weights e α1, and {αt
t}t≥1 is the sequence of welfare weights consistent with e α1. The main
intermediate result that we need, in order to prove that the sequence of welfare weights
{αt






By construction, this condition is satisﬁed for t = 1. It implies that next sequence e α2,









τ−t−1} > 0,τ ≥ 2.







τ−t−1} > 0,τ ≥ t.





















If θ > ρ, this proves that α
t+1
τ+1 > θ{αt+1
τ } > ρ{αt+1






















which completes the proof.
Lemma 6
We will show that ρ < θ gives ρ < g/α < θ, while θ < ρ results in θ < g/α < ρ. First
compare g/α in (45) with ρ:
g/α < ρ ⇔
0 < [α(1 − δθ) + ω(1 − δ)](ρ − θ) ⇔
θ < ρ
The second equivalence follows because all terms between the square brackets are positive.
It follows that ρ < θ gives ρ < g/α, while θ < ρ results in g/α < ρ. Now compare g/α
and θ:
g/α < θ ⇔
ρ[1 − δθ + θω(1 − δ)] < θ[1 − δθ + ρω(1 − δ) + α(1 − δθ)(ρ − θ)] ⇔
0 < (αθ − 1)(1 − δθ)(ρ − θ) ⇔
ρ < θ
The last equivalence follows because the ﬁrst term between brackets is negative while the
second is positive. This shows the second half of the lemma: ρ < θ gives υ < θ, while
θ < ρ results in θ < υ.
39Proposition 6
For the proof of the result, recall that the cost-beneﬁt law does not change the total
savings, but only the composition. We will ﬁrst establish that for given total savings
in the benchmark SPE without the cost-beneﬁt requirement the composition of savings
maximizes the continuation welfare given by value function Vt, so that the cost-beneﬁt
law must strictly decrease the value of future welfare to the current generation. From
Lemma 3, it is clear that the pair (g,h) maximizing V given g+h = I for some exogenous
I must satisfy g/h = ξ/ζ. As this ratio is preserved in the benchmark SPE, labeled with
BAU, we thus have
V (kt+1,st+1;g
CBR,h
CBR) < V (kt+1,st+1;g
BAU,h
BAU)








































The second inequality follows from the fact that welfare without constraints on invest-
ments, as in the benchmark SPE, must exceed welfare with additional constraints.
Proposition 7
















e g + ωe h + ln(1 − g − h),








40Let us use δ
∗ = α+ω
1+ω for the critical persistence of the public asset. Comparing the
ratio in investments between the benchmark SPE without the cost-beneﬁt rule, denoted
















1 − α − (δ − δ
∗)(1 + ω)
,
where the ratio ξ/ζ is obtained from the Appendix for the value function. When δ = δ
∗,
the ratio equals one. This is the case where imposing the cost-beneﬁt rule has no bite
since the rule is satisﬁed anyways; the equilibrium is Planner-equivalent as the persistence
of the public asset happens to match the persistence of the other asset. When δ > δ
∗, the
ratio exceeds one and the Planner-equivalence is lost by having too much investment in
the neoclassical capital. Imposing the cost-beneﬁt law in this case will further increase
investments in the capital stock, at the cost of the public good, and the deviation from
the ﬁrst-best steady-state utility must increase. If the public good is ﬂuid (δ < δ
∗), the
equilibrium investments in capital are too low, and imposing cost-beneﬁt law decreases
them further, thereby again increasing the deviation from the ﬁrst-best steady-state
outcome.





equivalent compensating variation of B relative to A, in terms of the consumer good, is
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